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Bowery, Charles R., Jr. Lee & Grant: Profiles in Leadership from the
Battlefields of Virginia. AMACOM, $24.00 ISBN 814408192
Major Charles R. Bowery, Jr., is an aviation officer in the U.S. Army and
has served as a history instructor at West Point. He has written many articles
and reviews for military history encyclopedias and journals, including
Gettysburg Magazine. He is stationed in Ansbach, Germany, where he serves the
First Infantry Division, and is currently deployed in Iraq.Interview with Major
Charles R. Bowery, Jr.
Interviewed by Frank Winter Hardie
Civil War Book Review (CWBR): Your book is structured on a detailed,
chronological history of the Overland Campaign from the viewpoint of the two
generals. How did you decide to use this campaign as a case study on
leadership applicable to modern society?
Major Charles R. Bowery, Jr. (CRB): The idea came to me in 2002, while I
was serving as a military history instructor at the U.S. Military Academy in West
Point, New York. The Civil War Eastern Theater has been my research and
writing focus for a number of years, and the Overland Campaign seemed like a
natural fit when Amacom Publishing solicited our department for manuscript
proposals. This campaign brought together on the same stage two of the most
compelling figures in military history, and it offers the modern reader a number
of leadership and management principles, as well as an exciting historical
narrative.
CWBR: Lee and Grant had different but successful styles of managing
their forces 140 years ago. Which style, or aspects of their styles, do you think
are most suitable for leadership in today's business arena and today's warfare?
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CRB: From the leadership toolbox of Robert E. Lee, I would offer the
decentralized, delegating style that he most often employed in battle. This
leadership style allows capable subordinates in any arena, be it business or the
military, to flourish and develop their own skills while they help the organization
achieve its objectives. Any reader familiar with Lee's campaigns will note that
this leadership style sometimes got Lee into trouble--the first day at Gettysburg
comes to mind--but the fact remains that any endeavor involving far-flung
subordinates and a fluid, quickly changing environment demands it.
Ulysses S. Grant was an outstanding leader because of his ability to apply
resources to an overarching vision, and then to see that vision through to the end
without being deterred by temporary setbacks. Once he attained the position of
Commanding General in 1864, Grant capitalized upon his immense influence
and credibility, harnessed the warmaking power of the Union, designed a
strategy that accounted for both, and saw it through to victory with dogged
persistence. Even in the darkest days of the Overland Campaign, when the Army
of the Potomac was suffering unprecedented casualties and northern newspapers
were beginning to label him a butcher, Grant forged ahead and proposed to fight
it out on this line if it takes all summer. He retained ultimate faith both in his
own judgment and the capabilities of his men.
Business and warfare today are of course much different from the 19th
century, but certain threads of continuity apply regardless or time or place.
Subordinates will always follow and work hard for a leader who demonstrates
skill at his or her job, true concern for subordinates' welfare, and an ability to
balance institutional and personal needs. Lee and Grant embodied those threads
of continuity, so I think their stories are as relevant today as ever.
CWBR: Do any particular decisions of Lee's or Grant's stick out in your
mind as their best or worst?
CRB: Because the Overland Campaign subjected both generals and both
armies to incredible stresses and strains, I will focus on each general's worst
decisions. These mistakes stemmed from the campaign's ferocity, and are
insights into each general's character.
Robert E. Lee did a generally sound job of reacting to Grant's offensive
moves, but Lee got into real trouble when he attempted to predict his adversary's
intentions. Historian Gordon C. Rhea has written that, contrary to popular belief,
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Lee was not very good during this campaign at predicting what Grant would do.
The best example occurred on May 12 during the Battle of Spotsylvania, when
Lee removed his artillery from the Mule Shoe salient, believing that Grant was
once again about to move around the Confederate right flank. This proved not to
be the case, and before Lee could return the guns, Grant launched a crushing
attack that almost splintered the southern position. This faulty decision stemmed
from Lee's overconfidence in his ability to divine his opponent's next move. This
worked well against less-capable Union generals, but not against Grant. After
this bad decision, Lee had to exercise a skill that was undoubtedly one of his
best, reacting to an enemy strike and cleaning up the damage. This Lee and the
Army of Northern Virginia did with skill and ferocity, restoring the Spotsylvania
position to its impregnable best.
Grant's worst moment during the campaign is commonly held to be his
decision to attack at Cold Harbor, a decision based once again on his
overconfident, unsubstantiated belief that Lee's army was on its last legs. I would
like to propose another moment and another decision, one that had lasting
negative effects on the Army of the Potomac. On May 7-8, Philip H. Sheridan's
Union cavalry fought with elements of Jeb Stuart's rebel cavalry for possession
of a key crossroads at Todd's Tavern, on the Brock Road a short distance north
of Spotsylvania. Sheridan mismanaged this battle, allowing Fitzhugh Lee's
troopers the opportunity to effectively bar the way for the Army of the Potomac's
move south. On May 8, Meade and Sheridan had a heated shouting match at the
tavern about the employment of Union cavalry, after which Meade rightfully
complained to Grant. When Meade made the comment that Sheridan proposed
taking the army's cavalry on a raid to draw out and destroy Jeb Stuart, Grant
responded by siding with Sheridan, over Meade's objections, and ordering the
raid.
In making this decision, Grant damaged the operational capabilities of his
army and seriously degraded its command climate. Without cavalry, Meade's
army was like a boxer groping in the dark, unable to capitalize on opportunities
for maneuver around Spotsylvania. By siding with a subordinate, and a new one
at that, over the commanding general of the Army of the Potomac, Grant
compounded Meade's fears that he was being marginalized and created a rupture
in their relationship that never really healed. This personnel move exacerbated a
perceived rift in the army's high command between the established eastern
leaders and the westerners who joined the army under Grant's tutelage.
Sheridan's raid did result in the mortal wounding of Stuart at Yellow Tavern, but
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the Southern cavalry was not by any means destroyed, and Lee's remaining
cavalry generals, led eventually by Wade Hampton, were as effective as ever.
This decision points to Grant's occasional lack of sensitivity to interpersonal
issues within his high command, and highlights his tendency to make overly
aggressive decisions without considering second and third order effects.
CWBR: In your book, you say that one of Grant's signal weaknesses was
his overconfidence, but that at times, this confidence became his strongest
asset. What is your key to determining the difference between confidence and
overconfidence?
CRB: An excellent question that gets to the heart of good leadership, and the
fine line that can separate success and failure. I would say that a leader must
continually examine his or her plans for the second and third order effects they
will produce. This process of introspection and self-examination can help to head
off potential disasters, and can introduce a healthy bit of skepticism into one's
thinking.
As an Operations Officer, I am responsible for my unit's Tactical Operations
Center (TOC) when we deploy or conduct combat operations. Military TOCs
frequently display a sign board with three questions: What Happened? What Are
We Doing About It? Who Else Needs to Know? These are examples of the sorts
of questions a leader can ask to avoid the pitfalls of overconfidence. When things
seem to be going the most smoothly, small problems or mistakes can go
unnoticed.
CWBR: By all accounts, Lee had a reserved and non-confrontational
personality. How was he so successful in a world defined by confrontation and
conflict?
CRB: In general, Lee had no need for confrontational, in your face
leadership because he inspired his army with his better qualities. The officers
and men of the Army of Northern Virginia had absolute faith in Lee's judgment
and leadership abilities; Lee was a good man as well as a great man, and proves
that this method can work in any environment. This is the essence of
Transformational Leadership, an ideal toward which both generals moved their
legions during the course of the war.
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CWBR: Having served as an instructor at West Point, and an officer in
active duty, your career has parallels to several Civil War officers. Is there one
with whom you identify, or share similar commanding styles?
CRB: Because I am a Virginia native, and because I have studied and read
about him for my whole life, I would say that I identify more with Robert E. Lee
than with Grant, even though my admiration for Grant's generalship has grown
as I have learned more about him. In my daily duties, I try to emulate Lee's
reserved demeanor, sense of humor, and willingness to lead by personal example
at critical moments. These qualities, when combined with Lee's ability to lead
and guide subordinates without micromanaging, seem to resonate with the
military personnel I lead.
CWBR: How has your experience in Iraq enhanced your understanding of
Lee and Grant's relevancy to today's world?
CRB: As a field grade officer, and in effect third-in-command of a battalion
of 300 soldiers in Iraq, I learned a great deal about organizational leadership
from my study of Lee and Grant. During the Overland Campaign, both generals
employed goal-setting, good followership, management of resources,
communication of shared visions, and political savvy. Those skills served me
very well in Iraq. I will certainly never be in the same league with either general,
and the chances of my occupying those rarefied heights of power are minimal at
best, but I can always strive to emulate their examples and avoid their failures. In
doing so, I hope to make a positive difference when and where I serve the nation.
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